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Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1988 Term 
Robert E. Riggs* 
Mark T. Urban** 
J. INTRODUCTION 
This article is the third annual survey of Supreme Court voting 
behavior presented by the BYU journal of Public Law. 1 As in previous 
years, it examines the positions taken by individual justices of the 
United States Supreme Court on selected categories of cases decided 
during the immediately preceding term. The classification scheme is 
designed to provide indicators of the justices' views on important 
dimensions of constitutional interpretation and individual rights. Nine 
of the categories are based on the nature of the issues or the character 
of the parties. A tenth category, added last year, tabulates the number 
of times each member of the Court joined with the majority during the 
past (1988) term in thirty-four decisions that could have been reversed 
had any member of the majority coalition voted instead with the minor-
ity. The issue and party categories are as follows: 
1) Civil controversies in which a state, or one of its officials or 
political subdivisions, is opposed by a private party. 
2) Civil controversies in which the federal government, or one of 
its agencies or officials, is opposed by a private party. 
3) State criminal cases. 
4) Federal criminal cases. 
5) First amendment issues of speech, press, association, and free 
exercise of religion. 
6) Equal protection issues. 
7) Statutory civil rights claims. 
8) Issues of federal court jurisdiction, standing, justiciability and 
related matters. 
* Robert E. Riggs is a Professor of Law, Brigham Young University, B.A., 1952, M.A., 
1953, University of Arizona; Ph.D., 1955, University of Illinois; LL.B., 1963, University of 
Arizona. 
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1. Riggs, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1986 Term, 2 BYU J. Pus. L. 15 (1988); Riggs 
and Moss, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: 1987 Term, 3 BYU J. Pus. L. 59 (1989). 
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9) Federalism issues. 
Tables 1-9 present voting data for these nine issue-related categories. 
Table 10 deals with the swing-vote cases. 
Each of the first nine categories is intended to reveal attitudes of 
the justices toward two super-issues which are relevant to most Su-
preme Court decision-making-individual rights and judicial restraint. 
Criminal prosecutions, as well as claims arising under the first amend-
ment, equal protection clause, and civil rights statutes, have an obvious 
relevance for individual rights. The relationship between individual 
rights and the two categories of civil cases, where governmental and 
private interests conflict, is perhaps less obvious because facts and cir-
cumstances of individual cases vary greatly. Nevertheless, a relationship 
exists because, even in civil cases, the preference for a governmental 
party is usually at the expense of persons claiming rights against the 
government. The same is true of the federalism category. A vote for the 
state is likely to be a vote against a person seeking federal relief from 
alleged state encroachment upon his rights. 
Judicial restraint is normally identified with deference to legisla-
tures as the policy-making branch of government, respect for precedent, 
avoidance of constitutional questions when narrower grounds for deci-
sion exist, avoidance of unnecessary decisions, and respect for the fram-
ers' intent (when ascertainable) in construing constitutional text. 2 Judi-
cial restraint, as a hands-off policy, is more likely to favor the 
government as constituted authority than the individual who claims 
rights against the government. When the issue is whether to strike 
down a state law under the preemption doctrine, judicial restraint 
would usually dictate respect for the role of states within the federal 
system. 
Judicial restraint and concern for individual rights are not neces-
sarily opposite poles of a single attitudinal dimension. Concern for pre-
cedent, avoidance of constitutional questions and unnecessary decisions, 
deference to states, and allegiance to the framers' intent could cut either 
way with respect to individual rights, depending on the facts. Still, 
there is a good deal of tension between the concerns. Deference to legis-
latures frequently means rejection of an individual's claim, especially 
one predicated upon the impropriety of governmental action. Emphasis 
upon the framers' intent can mean unwillingness to read new individ-
ual rights into the Constitution. Reluctance to exercise federal court 
jurisdiction may leave the decision to state courts, with their possible 
2. For an extensive discussion of judicial restraint, see Lamb, judicial Restraint on the Su-
preme Court, in SUPREME COURT ACTIVISIM AND RESTRAINT 7 (S. Halpern & C. Lamb eds. 
1982). 
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bias in favor of actions by state governments, and the almost certain 
disappointment of the claimant seeking federal intervention. In the vot-
ing tabulations that follow, most of the data supporting an inference of 
judicial restraint, or the lack of it, will also be consistent, respectively, 
with a narrow or a broad view of individual rights. 
II. THE VOTING RECORD 
TABLE 1 
CIVIL CASES: STATE GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term %Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 32 16 66.7 67.9 71.8 
Scalia 29 20 59.2 51.7 64.1 
O'Connor 27 20 57.4 50.0 64.1 
Kennedy 28 21 57.1 50.0 
White 27 22 55.1 53.6 43.6 
Stevens 17 31 35.4 37.9 46.2 
Blackmun 15 34 30.6 44.8 36.8 
Marshall 10 37 21.3 34.5 30.8 
Brennan 10 39 20.4 34.5 33.3 
Majority 25 24 51.0 51.7 53.9 
Split Decisions 16 9 64.0 58.8 
Unanimous 9 15 37.5 41.7 
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TABLE 2 
CIVIL CASES: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
VERSUS A PRIVATE PARTY 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 20 8 71.4 61.8 90.6 
White 20 8 71.4 72.7 87.1 
Kennedy 18 9 66.7 58.3 
O'Connor 17 11 60.7 76.5 75.0 
Blackmun 17 11 60.7 50.0 53.1 
Scalia 16 11 59.3 62.5 82.8 
Stevens 12 16 42.9 55.9 50.0 
Marshall 11 17 39.3 44.1 46.9 
Brennan 10 17 37.0 45.5 43.8 
Majority 18 10 64.3 61.8 68.8 
Split Decisions 10 5 66.7 55.6 
Unanimous 8 5 61.5 68.8 
TABLE 3 
STATE CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Government 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 23 4 85.2 73.7 87.9 
Kennedy 22 5 81.5 70.0 
O'Connor 21 6 77.8 61.1 75.8 
White 21 6 77.8 47.4 81.8 
Scalia 20 7 74.1 63.2 75.8 
Blackmun 10 17 37.0 26.3 30.3 
Stevens 10 17 37.0 21.1 21.2 
Brennan 5 22 18.5 5.3 3.0 
Marshall 4 23 14.8 5.3 3.0 
Majority 19 8 70.4 47.4 60.6 
Split Decisions 16 6 72.7 53.8 
Unanimous 3 2 60.0 16.7 
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TABLE 4 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASES 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Gov't 
For Gov't Against Gov't 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Kennedy 8 1 88.9 71.4 
Rehnquist 8 1 88.9 85.7 80.0 
White 8 1 88.9 85.7 90.0 
O'Connor 7 2 77.8 71.4 90.0 
Scalia 6 3 66.7 64.3 70.0 
Stevens 6 3 66.7 64.3 40.0 
Blackmun 5 4 55.6 78.6 30.0 
Marshall 3 6 33.3 28.6 0.0 
Brennan 2 6 25.0 38.5 0.0 
Majority 8 1 88.9 78.6 60.0 
Split Decisions 6 0 100.0 75.0 
Unanimous 2 1 66.7 100.0 
TABLE 5 
FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS OF EXPRESSION, 
ASSOCIATION, AND FREE EXERCISE 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term o/o Votes for Rights 
Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Brennan 13 3 81.3 84.6 91.7 
Marshall 13 4 76.5 84.6 91.7 
Stevens 11 6 64.7 50.0 50.0 
Blackmun 7 10 41.2 69.2 72.7 
Kennedy 6 10 37.5 66.7 
Scalia 6 11 35.3 38.5 36.4 
O'Connor 4 12 25.0 23.1 45.5 
White 4 13 23.5 30.8 41.7 
Rehnguist 3 13 18.8 16.7 16.7 
Majority 6 11 35.3 50.0 58.3 
Split Decisions 2 7 22.2 50.0 
Unanimous 4 4 50.0 50.0 
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TABLE 6 
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term % Votes for Rights 
Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
O'Connor 4 2 66.7 12.5 42.9 
Stevens 4 2 66.7 28.6 33.3 
White 4 2 66.7 12.5 28.6 
Blackmun 3 2 60.0 50.0 57.1 
Kennedy 4 3 57.1 33.3 
Rehnquist 4 3 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Scalia 4 3 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Brennan 3 3 50.0 37.5 71.4 
Marshall 3 3 50.0 37.5 71.4 
Majority 4 3 57.1 12.5 14.3 
Split Decisions 1 0 100.0 0.0 
Unanimous 3 3 50.0 20.0 
TABLE 7 
STATUTORY CIVIL RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term % Votes for Rights 
Claim 
For Claim Against Claim 1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
Brennan 19 1 95.0 87.5 84.6 
Marshall 17 1 94.4 87.5 84.6 
Blackmun 16 4 80.0 87.5 84.6 
Stevens 14 5 73.7 87.5 61.5 
White 11 9 55.0 62.5 61.5 
O'Connor 10 9 52.6 42.9 30.8 
Kennedy 9 11 45.0 66.7 
Scalia 8 12 40.0 57.1 38.5 
Rehnguist 7 13 35.0 37.5 38.5 
Majority 10 10 50.0 75.0 53.9 
Split Decisions 3 9 25.0 60.0 
Unanimous 71 87.5 100.0 
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TABLE 8 
CASES RAISING A CHALLENGE TO 
THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 T~rm o/o Votes for Jurisdiction 
For Against 1988 1987 1986 
.I urisdiction .I urisdiction Term Term Term 
Marshall 27 9 75.0 57.1 57.1 
Stevens 27 10 73.0 57.1 71.4 
Brennan 24 12 66.7 62.8 60.7 
Blackmun 24 13 64.9 58.1 64.3 
White 23 14 62.2 51.2 71.4 
O'Connor 18 17 51.4 42.9 64.3 
Kennedy 19 18 51.4 56.3 
Rehnquist 19 18 51.4 47.6 67.9 
Scalia 18 18 50.0 36.6 61.5 
Majority 23 14 62.2 55.8 60.7 
Split Decisions 10 6 62.5 71.4 
Unanimous 13 8 61.9 48.3 
TABLE 9 
FEDERALISM CASES 
Justice Number of Votes, 1988 Term %Votes for State Claim 
For Against 1988 1987 1986 
State Federal 
Claim Claim Term Term Term 
Rehnquist 17 4 81.0 46.2 
Scalia 16 5 76.2 30.8 
O'Connor 14 5 73.7 33.3 
Kennedy 16 6 72.7 33.3 
White 14 8 63.6 30.8 
Stevens 12 9 57.1 46.2 
Blackmun 9 13 40.9 46.2 
Marshall 7 14 33.3 53.8 
Brennan 7 15 31.8 53.8 
Majority 13 9 59.1 38.5 
Split Decisions 6 6 50.0 33.3 
Unanimous 7 3 70.0 42.9 
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TABLE 10 
SWING-VOTE ANALYSIS: WHO VOTES MOST OFTEN 
WITH THE MAJORITY IN CLOSE CASES 
Justice 
Kennedy 
O'Connor 
Rehnquist 
White 
Scalia 
Blackmun 
Brennan 
Stevens 
Marshall 
Number of Votes, 1988 Term 
With Against 
Majority Majority 
28 6 
26 8 
26 8 
26 8 
25 9 
13 21 
9 25 
9 25 
8 26 
III. ANALYSIS 
o/o Votes with Majority 
1988 1987 1986 
Term Term Term 
82.4 71.4 
76.5 64.5 
76.5 70.0 
76.5 77.4 
73.5 66.7 
38.2 45.2 
26.5 40.0 
26.5 61.3 
23.5 38.7 
A list of cases included in each of the ten tables, and the criteria 
governing their selection, are presented in an appendix to this article. 
Each case was read and coded by three readers, and differences were 
discussed in order to achieve consensus on the appropriate classifica-
tion. The result undoubtedly falls short of perfect validity and reliabil-
ity, but we believe that other readers using the same coding criteria 
would arrive at substantially the same results. Still, some difficult 
problems of judgment remain. For example, in Price Waterhouse v. 
Hopkins, 3 four justices voted to remand a Title VII sex discrimination 
case because the petitioner employer had been held to a standard of 
"clear and convincing" evidence, rather than merely a "preponder-
ance," in meeting its burden of persuasion. Two justices concurred, 
though disagreeing with the plurality in some respects, and three jus-
tices dissented because they would have reversed outright in favor of the 
employer. Since the employer was the petitioner, all nine in some sense 
voted in favor of the employer and against the employee's claim. The 
case nevertheless was coded six votes for the respondent-employee's 
statutory civil rights claim and three votes against because the six were 
3. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989). 
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considerably more sympathetic to the claim than the three dissenters. 
This seemed the best way to reflect the impact of the dissent and the 
very real differences among the members of the Court. At the same 
time, grouping the two concurrences with the four in the plurality ig-
nored differences among those justices. Most of the decisions fit with 
little distortion into a dichotomous classification of "for" or "against," 
but a few, like Hopkins, leave room for legitimate difference of opinion 
how a particular justice's "vote" should be coded. 
With that caveat, a brief discussion of the statistical tables may be 
helpful. The first four tables represent categories which are, for the 
most part, mutually exclusive: a case coded in one of the categories is 
unlikely to be included in any of the other three. By definition, a case 
would not be categorized as both civil and criminai,4 nor would a case 
on appeal involve a simultaneous federal and state prosecution. How-
ever, a civil suit having a private party on one side and both a state and 
a federal agency or official on the other is not inconceivable. One case 
of that nature was decided during the 1988 term,11 and was included in 
both Tables 1 and 2. In contrast, the last five tables do not comprise 
mutually exclusive categories either among themselves or with the party 
categories. A case raising more than one relevant issue is included in 
each relevant category. For example, an action by a private party 
against a state might raise issues pertaining to the first amendment, 
equal protection, and jurisdiction. If so, it would be included in all 
three issue tables! as well as in Table 1 (state v. private party). The 
voting alignment would not necessarily be the same for each issue.6 In a 
number of instances a case was coded more than once in the same cate-
gory. This occurred when the facts raised two or more distinct issues 
affecting the disposition of the case and the issues were decided by dif-
fering voting alignments.7 
4. In two cases we had difficulty deciding whether the action was civil or criminal. Both were 
ultimately placed in the criminal tables. See United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 (1989); Cap-
lin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 (1989). 
5. Hoffman v. Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989). Both a 
state and a federal agency were named respondents. 
6. For example, in Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989), the Court was 
unanimous on the jurisdictional issue but divided 6-3 in holding that the Texas sales tax exemp-
tion for religious periodicals violated the establishment clause. In the 1988 term no case was in-
cluded in more than four categories. 
7. For example, Sable Communications v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 
2829 (1989), the dial-a-porn case, raised two separate first amendment questions: I) whether 
"indecent" material could be totally banned from the telephone lines, and 2) whether "obscene" 
material could be banned. The Court gave a unanimous "no" to the first question, and a 6-3 
"yes" to the second. The case is therefore tabulated twice in Table 2 and twice in Table 5, because 
the Court voted against the government on one first amendment issue and for the government on 
the other. 
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The results of the analysis lend themselves primarily to discussion 
within categories, but given the widespread public commentary on the 
Court's shift toward greater conservatism this term, an appraisal of that 
trend in light of our data may be appropriate. As the decisions are 
analyzed in our tables, a conservative position would ordinarily be in-
ferred from a vote favoring the government, a vote against a claim of 
constitutional or statutory rights, a vote against the exercise of jurisdic-
tion, and a vote in favor of state (rather than federal) authority on 
federalism questions. There are, however, exceptions to this general 
rule. Some decisions were unanimous, indicating that the law or the 
facts of the case, or both, pointed so clearly one way that there was 
little room for play of liberal or conservative ideologies. In other cases, 
much fewer in number, the peculiar nature of the facts created a re-
verse of the expected relationship, with liberals opposing a civil rights 
claim, for example, and conservatives supporting the claim. A good il-
lustration is the City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co.,8 in which a 
white-owned construction company brought action to void the city's 
30o/o minority set-aside requirement for city construction contracts, 
claiming it violated the company's equal protection rights. The issue 
was reverse discrimination, and the decision in favor of the contractor 
was widely regarded as a set-back for affirmative action. On these facts 
the three most liberal members of the Court-Justices Brennan, Mar-
shall, and Blackmun-voted for the government and against the equal 
protection claim, while the remaining six, including the most conserva-
tive members of the Court, voted against the government and for the 
contractor's equal protection claim. Despite such exceptional cases, the 
expected general correlation between ideology and voting is apparent in 
most of the tables. 
The voting of individual justices can be compared with each other 
for any given year, but a shift in the orientation of the Court or its 
members requires a comparison over time. For our analysis the best 
available baseline is the comparable data generated for the two prior 
years. In the tables this information appears in the form of percentages 
for each justice and, in all but the swing-vote table, for the Court ma-
jority. One must use caution in interpreting the data because the per-
centages are affected not only by the behavior of the individual justices 
but also by the nature of the cases decided in a given year. A vote to 
uphold a greater percentage of criminal convictions than in a previous 
term may mean that the justice or the Court has become tougher on 
criminal defendants. Alternatively, it may mean only that this year the 
8. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
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facts or the law (or both) of a number of individual cases were less 
favorable to the defendant than in previous years. The same is true of 
other categories of cases. Hence, one cannot be confident that percent-
age changes from one year to another reflect a change in ideological 
orientation of an individual justice, or of the Court majority. Similar 
directional changes across a number of tables, however, would 
strengthen the hypothesis that a genuine shift in attitude has occurred. 
This is true because variation in the nature of the cases should be ran-
dom and thus is unlikely to account for a pronounced directional 
change in several tables. 
This year a directional change is apparent for the Court as a 
whole, as indicated by the percentage figures in the bottom three rows 
of each table, which show how the majority of the Court voted. The 
first of the three rows gives figures on all cases included in the tables; 
the second row is limited to decisions with one or more dissenting votes; 
and figures in the bottom row are calculated only from cases with no 
dissent. For all cases a statistical shift toward a more conservative result 
appears, as compared with the two preceding years, in the following 
tables: state criminal and federal criminal (Tables 3 and 4), first 
amendment (Table 5), statutory civil rights (Table 7), and federalism 
(Table 9).9 No significant change appears with respect to the two cate-
gories of civil cases (Tables 1 and 2) or the jurisdictional questions 
(Table 8). In Table 8 the modest shift from the previous year runs in 
the liberal direction, toward more expansive jurisdiction. Table 6, deal-
ing with equal protection, shows a large percentage difference from the 
two preceding terms, also in a liberal rather than a conservative 
direction. 
Most of the apparent inconsistency in the trends indicated by the 
tables is eliminated when percentages are calculated separately for cases 
in which a dissenting vote was cast. Excluding unanimous decisions 
(including decisions in which fewer than the nine justices participated 
or reached the issue) separately has the disadvantages inherent in a 
smaller universe of cases, but the advantage of including only those in 
which ideological differences might have affected the outcome. When 
only split decisions are counted, every category except equal protection 
displays a more conservative result for the 1988 term than for 1987. 
The equal protection table (Table 6) can also be explained in a 
way that removes any real inconsistency, by examining only non-unani-
mous cases. During the 1987 term the equal protection issue was ad-
dressed eight times, but in only three cases was it resolved by a divided 
9. Data collection for the federalism category was not begun until the 1987 term. Riggs and 
Moss, supra note 1. 
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court. 10 Two of the split decisions, involving school busing fees 11 and 
food stamps for strikers,12 were resolved in favor of the conservative 
position (rejecting equal protection challenges to the busing fees and the 
denial of food stamps); and the third, upholding Mississippi's statutory 
15o/o penalty assessed upon unsuccessful appeal of a lower court judg-
ment/3 was opposed only by Justice Blackmun (Justices Stevens and 
Kennedy not participating). The ideological content of that issue must 
have been ambiguous because Justices Brennan and Marshall joined 
the conservatives. The party claiming equal protection was a large bus-
iness corporation, obviously not well placed to appeal to the liberal jus-
tices' sympathy for the underdog. With rejection of the equal protection 
claim in every non-unanimous 1987 case, there was no room for im-
provement of the conservative position in 1988. The percentages, in 
fact, show a complete reversal of position. But here the appearance be-
lies reality. Only one equal protection case was decided during the 1988 
term by a divided vote. Table 6 shows the vote going in favor of that 
claim, which is correct, but the case was City of Richmond, the minor-
ity set-off reverse discrimination case. Hence a vote for equal protection 
was a conservative vote, and the score, based only on non-unanimous 
decisions, again was conservatives 100o/o, liberals Oo/o. 
These data indicate that the conservative shift of the Court during 
the 1988 term is not limited to a few select cases but is statistically 
apparent across a wide range of cases. The swing-vote table also con-
firms this directional movement. Looking at the percentage figures for 
individual justices, the conservative members voted more frequently 
with the majority than did the liberals in both the 1987 and 1988 
terms, along with Justice White (a conservative on some issues but a 
swing voter on others, over the years). However, for the 1987 term a 
gradual decline in the percentage of majority voting is evident from one 
justice to the next in order. Only three percentage points separate Jus-
tice O'Connor (generally regarded as a conservative) from Justice Ste-
vens (in the past a swing-voter, but with a liberal orientation); and the 
largest break-sixteen percentage points-is between Justices Stevens 
and Blackmun.14 By contrast, for the 1988 term, there is a 35 percent-
age point break between the lowest conservative (Scalia) and the high-
10. Kadrmas v. Dickinson Pub. Schools, 108 S. Ct. 2481 (1988); Bankers Life and Casualty 
Co. v. Crenshaw, 108 S. Ct. 1645 (1988); Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 108 S. Ct. 1184 
(1988). 
II. Kadrmas, supra note I 0. 
12. Lyng, supra note 10. 
13. Bankers Life and Casualty, supra note I 0. 
14. The ordering of justices for the 1987 term can be gleaned from Table 10 only with some 
effort because the members of the Court are listed in order of their 1988 percentages. 
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est liberal (Blackmun). The percentage score is higher this term for 
every conservative justice (excepting Justice White, less consistently 
conservative than the others) and lower for each of the four more lib-
eral justices. Clearly the conservatives voted more as a coalition on the 
close cases during the 1988 term than during the preceding two terms. 
The same contrast also appears in the composition of the ~oting coali-
tions in the thirty-four cases decided by a 5-4 vote. In nineteen of the 
thirty-four cases, the majority consisted of Chief Justice Rehnquist and 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White. In six additional cases 
the winning coalition included at least three of the four most consist-
ently conservative justices (Rehnquist, Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia). 
Thus, conservatives dominated the winning coalition in 25 of 34, or 
73.5% of close cases. During the previous term the corresponding 
figures were 17 of 31, or 54.8%. Looking at the liberal end of the scale, 
Justices Brennan and Marshall together voted with the majority in 12 
of 31 close cases (38.7%) during the 1987 term but in just 7 of 34 
(20.6%) such decisions in this term. All of these figures attest to the 
shift in the Court's ideological orientation that appears from the issue 
tables. If the change is attributable to Justice Kennedy's first full year 
on the Court, the newest justice has indeed made a difference. 
An examination of the individual tables is now in order. 
A. Civil Cases with Government Opposing a Private Party 
Table 1 lists summary percentages and the number of times each 
justice voted for and against the state government in a civil dispute with 
a private litigant. Table 2 gives the same kind of data for civil disputes 
between the federal government and private parties. Inspection of the 
rankings shows no special surprises; the conservative justices are at the 
top (pro-government) of the scale and the liberal justices are at the 
bottom. Chief Justice Rehnquist, who fell almost to the middle of the 
rankings on the federal table last year (when many observers believed 
he was treading cautiously with his eight-member Court most of the 
term), regained his customary spot at the top of the list. In the same 
table Justice Blackmun edged out Justice Scalia for the number five 
ranking, but only by 1.4 percentage points. Last year Justice Kennedy, 
participating in fewer than half of the Court's decisions, was squarely 
at the midpoint of both tables. This year he has moved a little closer to 
the top. Justice O'Connor showed the biggest individual change on ei-
ther table, dropping nearly 16 percentage points and from first to 
fourth place in the federal rankings. The greatest variations in the state 
table all occurred at the bottom of the list-Brennan, Marshall and 
Blackmun each declined 13-14 percentage points in their support of the 
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state. As in past years, the federal government prevailed in a somewhat 
larger percentage of its cases than did the states. 
Examination of the state cases (Table 1) in which justices at the 
extremes voted contrary to their anticipated pro- or anti-government 
leanings shows that the discrepancy is largely accounted for by the 
unanimous decisions which, we assume, suggests a government case 
strong enough to transcend ideological differences. Chief Justice Rehn-
quist, at the top of the scale, voted only twice against the state when the 
Court was divided. One was the City of Richmond reverse discrimina-
tion case, discussed above, in which a vote against the city was the 
conservative position. The other case was an 8-1 decision in which only 
Justice Stevens was willing to uphold Michigan's tax exemption for 
retirement benefits of state (but not federal) employees against a chal-
lenge based on preemption and alleged violation of intergovernmental 
tax immunity. 111 At the bottom of the scale Justices Brennan and Mar-
shall voted only once for the government in a divided vote, and that was 
in City of Richmond. Their liberal voting record in this category was 
therefore perfect. 
In Table 2, civil cases involving a federal government party, most 
of the unexpected votes occurred in unanimous decisions. Five of Chief 
Justice Rehnquist's and five of Justice White's votes against the gov-
ernment were in this category. The other three, for each justice, were 
an odd assortment of cases with little obvious ideological content. Two 
of Justice Rehnquist's were 8-1 decisions, one a tax case holding the 
taxpayer was entitled to capital gains treatment on a stock transaction16 
and the other a decision under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requiring the Department of Justice to make available, on request, cop-
ies of district court decisions the Department receives in the course of 
litigating tax cases. 17 His third anti-government vote was cast with the 
majority in Mallard v. United States District Court for the Southern 
District of Iowa, 18 a 5-4 decision holding that a federal district court 
15. Davis v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1500 (1989). Justice Scalia, in addition, 
voted against the government in Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2491 (1989) (Connecticut's 
attempt to regulate price of beer in other states violates commerce clause); Missouri v. Jenkins, 
109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989) (eleventh amendment does preclude attorney fee award against state); and 
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S.Ct. 1294 (1989) (Virgin Islands' residency requirement for bar ad-
mission violates privileges and immunities clause). Justice O'Connor, in addition to City of Rich-
mond, Davis, and jenkins, voted against the government in County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 109 S. 
Ct. 3086 (1989) (display of creche violates establishment clause); and Texas Monthly, Inc. v. 
Bullock, 109 S. Ct. 890 (1989) (sales tax exemption for religious periodicals violates establishment 
clause). 
16. Commissioner v. Clark, 109 S. Ct. 1455 (1989). 
17. United States Dep't of Justice v. Tax Analysts, 109 S. Ct. 2841 (1989). 
18. 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989). 
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may not require an unwilling attorney to represent an indigent defend-
ant in a civil case. Justice White stood with the Chief Justice in Mal-
lard and in the FOIA case and cast his third vote against the govern-
ment in Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Association, Inc. 19 His dissent 
in Frank (along with Marshall and Stevens) related only to its formal 
disposition, not to its substance, since he would have affirmed the deci-
sion below. The majority found the appeal moot. 
At the bottom of the scale, Justice Brennan voted for the govern-
ment only twice and Justice Marshall three times in a divided Court. 
Both upheld the IRS in a dispute with a large life insurance com-
pany.20 Their sympathies for the underdog were perhaps not evoked by 
a well-heeled business corporation. Justice Brennan's other pro-govern-
ment vote was in Frank, where, as noted above, the distinction between 
the six in the majority and the three dissenters was merely technical.21 
Justice Marshall's other two votes for the government came in Mal-
lard22 (to require an unwilling attorney to perform pro bono services 
for indigents) and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 23 a decision disallow-
ing certain payments to the Church of Scientology as charitable deduc-
tions. His Mallard vote was clearly a vote for the underdog; his sup-
port for the IRS in Hernandez is not readily explicable on ideological 
grounds. 
B. Criminal Cases 
The two criminal case tables (Tables 3 and 4), as in previous 
terms, reflect the same ideological divisions as the civil case tables, but 
the voting is somewhat more polarized. In the state cases, Justices 
Brennan and Marshall voted for the prosecution more often than last 
year, but three of these decisions were unanimous. Marshall's one other 
uncharacteristic vote was a lone dissent in Olden v. Kentucky, 24 ad-
dressed not to the merits but to the Court's summary disposition of the 
case. 211 Justice Brennan's two votes for the government in non-unani-
19. 109 S. Ct. 1734 (1989). 
20. Colonial Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 109 S. Ct. 2408 (1989). 
21. See supra note 19 and accompanying text. In fact, only by contrast to the dissent could 
the majority position be called a vote for government. Frank, the Postmaster General, had already 
agreed to everything the Minnesota Newspaper Association wanted, which made the case moot, 
according to the majority. Declaring the case moot, however, was technically more favorable to 
Frank than affirming the decision below as the dissent would have done. 
22. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
23. 109 S. Ct. 2136 (1989). 
24. 109 S. Ct. 480 (1988). 
25. Justice Marshall has repeatedly objected to summary reversals, insisting that the Court 
should not reverse a lower court decision without the benefit of full briefing and oral argument. 
See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Bruder, 109 S. Ct. 205 (1988); Rhodes v. Stewart, 109 S. Ct. 202 
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mous decisions26 are less easily explained, but neither case involved a 
closely divided Court. In one of them27 Justice Marshall provided the 
lone dissent. In the other28 Justice Stevens joined Justice Marshall, but 
neither dissented on the merits. Justice Marshall objected once again to 
summary reversal without the benefit of full briefings, and both 
thought the case too insignificant to justify granting certiorari in the 
first instance. 
Among the conservative members of the Court, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist favored the criminal defendant in only two non-unanimous 
state cases,29 and each of them had only a single dissenter. One of the 
cases was Olden, where Justice Marshall objected to the summary re-
versal rather than to the merits of the decision. The other case,30 over 
the sole objection of Justice Kennedy, held that the "plain statement" 
rule of Michigan v. Long31 (as a basis for declining review of a state 
court decision reached on "adequate and independent state grounds") 
was applicable to federal habeas corpus proceedings as well as to direct 
review. Justice Kennedy's three non-unanimous votes against the gov-
ernment came in Olden, Texas v. johnson (the flag burning case),32 
and Penson v. Ohio, 33 where all members of the Court except Chief 
Justice Rehnquist agreed that the Ohio court failed to follow proper 
procedures in allowing appointed counsel to withdraw from the case.3 " 
Table 3 shows a division of the Court into two distinct groups-five 
who voted overwhelmingly in favor of the government and four who 
voted consistently in favor of the defendant. The gap between Justice 
Scalia and Justice Blackmun is a remarkable 3 7.1 percentage points. 
Table 4 (federal criminal cases), involves fewer decisions and ex-
(1988); Buchanan v. Stanships, Inc., 485 U.S. 265 (1988). 
26. Alabama v. Smith, 109 S. Ct. 2201 (1989), and Bruder, 109 S. Ct. at 205. 
27. Smith, supra note 26 
28. Bruder, supra. note 25 
29. Olden, 109 S. Ct. at 480; Harris v. Reed, 109 S. Ct. 1038 (1989). 
30. See Harris, supra note 29. 
31. 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983). 
32. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989). 
33. I 09 S. Ct. 346 (1988). 
34. Justice O'Connor voted four times against the government in non-unanimous decisions: 
Olden, Penson, Harris, and Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). In Penry she voted to 
affirm the lower court's holding that the eighth amendment does not categorically prohibit capital 
punishment for a mentally retarded person, the most significant holding in the case; but she voted 
to reverse Penry's conviction because of an error in mitigation instructions. Justice White also had 
four non-unanimous pro-defendant votes: Olden, Penson, Harris, and South Carolina v. Gathers, 
109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989), in which he joined the four more liberal members of the Court in over-
turning a death penalty sentence. Justice Scalia had five non-unanimous votes in support of the 
defendant: Olden, Penson, Harris, Johnson, and Jones v. Thomas, 109 S. Ct. 2522 (1989), a 
decision rejecting a double jeopardy claim from which he dissented, along with Justices Brennan, 
Marshall, and Stevens. 
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hibits a more gradual progression in the rankings from very frequent to 
very infrequent support of the prosecution. As in previous years, the 
government's success rate in federal cases is higher than in state cases. 
Justices Rehnq uist, Kennedy and White voted against the prosecution 
only once, and that decision was unanimous. Justices Brennan and 
Marshall voted for the prosecution only once in a case when the Court 
was divided. 311 That decision, Mistretta v. United States, 36 upheld the 
constitutionality of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, with only Jus-
tice Scalia dissenting. This year's figures seem to confirm what last 
year's figures suggested about Justice Kennedy-he is noticeably more 
prosecution-oriented than his predecessor Justice Powell.37 
C. Individual Rights 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 deal with claims of constitutional and statutory 
rights. Table 5 (first amendment claims) and Table 7 (statutory civil 
rights claims) show the same broad voting patterns as Tables 1 through 
4 (government versus private party claims). There are slight variations 
in the rankings, but Justices Brennan and Marshall, followed by Jus-
tices Blackmun or Stevens, are at one extreme in both scales. Chief 
Justice Rehnquist is at the other extreme, followed in varying order by 
Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and White. Justices Kennedy and 
Scalia are noticeably more centrist on first amendment issues, while 
Justices O'Connor and White are more centrist on statutory civil rights 
issues. Table 6 (equal protection claims), does not show as clear a vot-
ing pattern but generally points in an unexpected direction, with con-
servatives supporting civil rights claims more frequently and liberals 
opposing them. This table, as explained above,38 is entirely misleading. 
All of the decisions but one were unanimous, six justices did not par-
ticipate in one or more of the decisions, and the facts of the one split 
decision, City of Richmond v. ].A. Croson Co., 39 were so postured that 
a vote for the city was a vote in favor of minority rights. 
Table 5 (first amendment claims) follows the anticipated distribu-
tion, and the fit is even closer when cases without dissent are elimi-
nated. In the split decisions, Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to 
uphold the first amendment claim in every instance, while the Chief 
35. Justice Marshall is shown in Table 4 with three pro-government votes to Justice Bren-
nan's two because Justice Brennan did not participate in United States v. Zolin, 109 S. Ct. 2619 
(1989), an otherwise unanimous decision. 
36. 109 S. Ct. 647 (1989). 
37. Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 61-65. 
38. See supra text accompanying notes 10-13. 
39. 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
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Justice and Justices White and O'Connor voted against it in every case. 
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, however, parted company with their con-
servative brethren in two important cases, giving the liberals the mar-
gin of victory in Texas v. johnson40 and Florida Star v. B.]. F. 41 Jus-
tice Blackmun, who supported most first amendment claims in the two 
previous terms, voted this term to reject most of them. 
Table 7 (statutory civil rights) also has few surprises. Justices 
Marshall and Brennan voted to uphold every statutory civil rights 
claim presented to the Court except in one unanimous decision. 42 At 
the conservative end, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not support a single 
civil rights claim in any decision marked by one or more dissents. Jus-
tice Scalia voted in favor of one such claim,43 Justice Kennedy two,"" 
and Justice O'Connor three. 411 Table 7 thus presents a nice ranking of 
members of the Court in descending order of predilection to construe 
broadly the protections granted by civil rights statutes. 
D. jurisdiction and justiciability Questions 
Table 8 (jurisdiction claims) conforms in general outline to our 
initial assumptions about judicial restraint-the liberal justices appear-
ing more inclined to exercise jurisdiction and the conservative justices 
less so. Justice White is at the mid-point of the scale, which comports 
with his past reputation as a swing-voter, although the biggest break in 
the table is the ll percentage point gap between him and Justices 
O'Connor, Kennedy, and Rehnquist. The number of jurisdiction and 
justiciability questions is large every term, but often the issue is not 
40. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (invalidating the Texas flag desecration statute). 
41. 109 S. Ct. 2603 (1989) (reversing a judgment imposing damages on a newspaper for 
publishing the name of a victim of sexual assault, contrary to state law). 
42. City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). This was a § 1983 action against the 
city for failure to provide medical treatment for the emotional illness of a person who was in police 
custody for about one hour. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Kennedy and Scalia, wrote an 
opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, which would have entered judgment outright for 
the city rather than remanding. This was another case difficult to classify. The city was petitioner; 
hence all ruled in the city's favor. On that basis we classified this as a unanimous decision. In at 
least one other case of this nature, discussed supra note 20 and accompanying text, we classified 
the case as a split decision. Here the nine were so much in agreement that we decided to disregard 
the partial dissent. 
43. Missouri v. Jenkins, 109 S. Ct. 2463 (1989). Two separate issues were raised-one per-
taining to the enhancement of an attorney fee award under § 1988 and the other to the enhance-
ment of law clerk and paralegal fees. Only the Chief Justice was opposed to the claim relating to 
law clerk and paralegal fees. 
44. Id. Kennedy supported the right to enhancement on both issues. 
45. ld. (the law clerk and paralegal claim); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 
(1989) (employer's burden of proof in a Title VII discrimination case); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 
S. Ct. 454 (1988) (dissented from holding that NCAA was not a state actor). 
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substantial enough to draw a single dissent. As shown by the figures on 
the second row from the bottom, the issue was disputed in only sixteen 
of the thirty-seven instances. The rankings in Table 8 are largely as 
expected, although the percentage differences are small. These differ-
ences are amplified when only the non-unanimous decisions are tabu-
lated, as follows: 
I ustice For I urisdiction Against o/o For 
Marshall 14 1 93.3 
Stevens 14 2 87.5 
Brennan 12 2 75.0 
Blackmun 11 5 68.8 
White 10 6 62.5 
O'Connor 6 9 40.0 
Kennedy 6 10 37.5 
Rehnquist 6 10 37.5 
Scalia 6 10 37.5 
Using these numbers, the total spread is 56 percentage points (com-
pared with 25 percentage points in Table 8), and a gap of 25 percent-
age points emerges between Justices White and O'Connor. If judicial 
restraint is identified with reluctance to exercise jurisdiction, it is also 
strongly identified-this year at least-with the judicial conservatives 
on the Court. Conversely, activism, as measured by willingness to exer-
cise jurisdiction in a disputed case, characterizes the liberal members of 
the Court. 46 
E. Federalism Issues 
Table 9 (federalism issues), used for the first time in last year's 
analysis of the 1987 term,47 deals with issues raised by conflict between 
federal and state governmental authority. Federalism, for purposes of 
this category, includes such matters as preemption, intergovernmental 
taxation, application of the tenth and eleventh amendments, and federal 
court interference with state court activities (other than review of state 
court decisions). Table 9 does not include cases in which the only con-
flict is alleged incompatibility of the state action with the United States 
46. Justice Marshall, who came closest to a perfect record in the revised table, cast his sole 
vote against the exercise of jurisdiction in Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989), the Birming-
ham firefighters case. Such a vote, had it been a majority, would have barred a challenge by white 
firefighters to a previously decreed affirmative action program. 
47. See Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 65. 
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Constitution. Nor does it include issues of "horizontal" (interstate) fed-
eralism, arising under the dormant commerce clause or the privileges 
and immunities clause in response to state-erected barriers to interstate 
commerce. 
In examining issues of federalism, we assume that the more con-
servative justices-Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy-would 
tend to favor state authority, while Justices Brennan, Marshall, and 
Blackmun would tend to support federal authority. For the 1987 term 
reported last year,48 the results were more or less the reverse of what 
we expected: Justices Brennan and Marshall appeared most supportive 
of the state; Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Stevens were in the 
middle; and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, White, and Scalia were the 
least supportive. We explained this anomaly by reference to the rela-
tively few split decisions (six of thirteen in the table) and the specific 
subject matter of the disputes which led the liberals to support the state 
position more frequently than the conservatives. 49 This explanation, in 
retrospect, is still plausible. For the 1988 term, however, no such ex-
planation is necessary because the ranking of the justices in Table 9 
falls cleanly into the anticipated pattern.60 
F. Swing-Vote Analysis 
Table 10 shows the number of times each justice voted with the 
majority in cases close enough to be decided by a single vote. For the 
1988 term, we identified thirty-four such decisions made by a 5 to 4 
vote. 51 In such cases, a shift of any one justice from the majority to the 
minority coalition would have created a new majority and a different 
result. We call this "swing-vote" analysis because each member of the 
majority is in a position to swing the decision one way or the other, 
assuming the other votes remain constant. Because each vote is crucial 
to the outcome, frequency of voting with the majority in such cases may 
48. /d. at 65, 75-76. 
49. Id. at 75-77. 
50. If the 10 decisions without dissent are excised, the ordering changes only 
slightly-O'Connor and Kennedy change places. Nor are the percentages changed substantially 
for the top six justices. The pro-United States position of the bottom three justices, however, 
becomes much more pronounced. Justice Blackmun moves from 40.9o/o for the state to 16. 7%, 
while Justices Marshall and Brennan at 33.3% and 31.8%, respectively, fall to 0% support of the 
state. 
51. This is the usual "close case." During the preceding term, however, when the Court 
consisted of only eight members before Justice Kennedy's confirmation, we included in the swing-
vote category 14 cases decided 5-4, 14 decided 5-3, and 3 decided 4-3. Seven additional 5-3 deci-
sions were not included because they were affirmances rather than reversals of a lower court 
decision. With 5-3 affirmances, the shift of one vote would not change the outcome because the 
case would be affirmed without opinion by a 4-4 vote. 
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be regarded as one index of influence on Court decision-making. 
The archetypical swing voter on the Court is a person not ideolog-
ically committed to a liberal or a conservative position who votes some-
times with one group and sometimes with the other, making the crucial 
difference on close cases. Justice White has occupied this position in 
recent years, as did Justice Powell before his retirement. 52 During the 
1987 term, Justice White was the most frequent swing voter in a Court 
that drew its winning coalitions in close cases more often from conserv-
atives than liberals. This year, however, Justice Kennedy was the most 
frequent swing voter, joining the majority on twenty-eight of thirty-
four issues, followed by Justices White, O'Connor, and the Chief Jus-
tice, each with twenty-six votes, and Scalia with twenty-five. In the 
same thirty-four decisions, the four liberal members of the 
Court-Blackmun, Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall-voted with the 
majority 13, 9, 9, and 8 times, respectively. This configuration suggests 
very little shifting from one group to another by the high scorers, and a 
conservative bloc quite consistently defeating the liberals. Justice Ken-
nedy voted on the liberal side twice to gain his edge over the Chief 
J ustice113 but never voted with the liberals in a losing cause. Justice 
O'Connor joined the liberals to make a winning coalition four 
times-more than any other conservative,114 but also voted with them 
four times on the losing side. 1111 Chief Justice Rehnq uist, tied at second 
from the top, never voted in a winning coalition dominated by liberal 
justices in a 5-4 decision. 116 Voting conservative was good enough to 
score high in the swing-vote table this term. 
52. See, e.g., Bender, Book Review, 82 MICH. L. REv. 635 (1984) (reviewing V. BLASI, 
THE BURGER CoURT (1983); Fallon, A Tribute to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 101 I-IARV. L. 
Rt:v. 399 ( 1987). 
53. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (Oag desecration), and Pittston Coal Group v. 
Sebben, 109 S. Ct. 414 (1988) (favoring black-lung disease claimants). 
54. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 1119 S. Ct. 3086 (1989) (creche violates establishment 
clause); Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 109 S. Ct. 2994 
(1989) (tribe has right to zone land on reservation); Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989) 
(mitigation instruction in sentencing proceeding erroneous); Sullivan v. Hudson, I 09 S. Ct. 2248 
(1989) (social security claimant may be awarded attorney fees). 
55. Mallard v. United States Dist. Court for S. Dist. of Iowa, 109 S. Ct. 1814 (1989) (with 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens); Schmuck v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (1989) (with Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Scalia); United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 109 S. Ct. 1026 (1989) (with 
Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens); NCAA v. Tarkanian, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988) (with Brennan, 
Marshall, and White). 
56. The closest he came was Schmuck, 109 S. Ct. 1443 (odometer tampering case in which 
he voted to affirm the conviction, along with Justices Blackmun, Stevens, White, and Kennedy). 
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IV. CoNCLUSION 
As in previous years, our discussion has highlighted some of the 
relationships appearing in patterns of Supreme Court voting without 
exhausting all credible interpretations of the data. The availability of 
information for previous terms gives an important temporal dimension 
to the analysis which, over the years, should add to the value of this 
report. In last year's report on the 1987 term, the tables did not show 
any major changes from the preceding term, either for individual jus-
tices or for the Court as a whole, despite the addition of Justice Ken-
nedy for the last few months of the term. 67 The 1988 term was a differ-
ent story. The whole Court shifted to the right, as detailed above, and, 
on the basis of full participation in the decided cases, Justice Kennedy 
moved closer to the conservative pole in several tables. There was also a 
tendency for the Court to be more polarized, with a greater point 
spread between the extremes of some of the tables: scores at the top of 
the tables are higher than last term, and scores at the bottom are lower. 
It is possible that the shift toward conservatism during the 1988 term 
may in retrospect appear only aberrational. However, given the present 
membership of the Court and what is known about their individual 
propensities, the 1988 term will likely be seen as part of a longer range 
swing of the pendulum. 
V. APPENDIX 
A. Explanation of Criteria for Selection and Classification of Cases 
1. The universe of cases 
Only cases decided during the 1988 term by a full opinion setting 
forth reasons for the decision are included in the data. Decisions on 
motions are excluded even if accompanied by an opinion. Cases han-
dled by summary disposition are included if accompanied by a full 
opinion for the Court, but not if the only opinion is a dissent. Cases 
decided by a 4-4 vote, hence resulting in affirmance without written 
opinion, are excluded. Both signed and per curiam opinions are consid-
ered full opinions if they set forth reasons in a more than perfunctory 
manner. Cases not fitting into any of the ten categories are, of course, 
not included in the data base for any of the tables. 
57. Riggs and Moss, supra note 1, at 61-65, 78. "Justice Kennedy," we sdid, "seems to have 
had little effect on the orientation of the Court during the 1987 term. To the extent of his partici-
pation, his voting behavior is quite comparable to that of his predecessor Justice Powell (except, 
perhaps, for a somewhat tougher attitude toward criminal defendants)." /d. at 78. 
1] SUPREME COURT VOTING 23 
2. Cases classified as civil or criminal 
Classification of cases as civil or criminal follows commonly ac-
cepted definitions; generally the nature of the case is clearly identified 
in the opinion. Last year one case, Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 
(1988), raised a difficult problem of classification because the outcome 
of the case hinged on whether the contempt citation was found to be 
civil or criminal. The case was remanded for a lower court determina-
tion of the issue, and we classified it as criminal because the lower 
courts had previously acted on that assumption. This year Caplin & 
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 2646 ( 1989) 
presented another difficult choice. The action was brought by attorneys, 
not themselves charged with a crime, to adjudicate their interest in 
property of their client that had been forfeited under the provisions of 
21 U.S.C. Section 853, a criminal statute. Because it interpreted a 
criminal statute and was incident to a criminal proceeding, we classified 
the case as criminal. 
3. Cases classified by nature of the parties 
Cases are included in Tables 1 through 4 only if governmental 
and private entities appear as opposing parties. This is necessarily true 
of criminal cases. Civil cases are excluded if they do not satisfy this 
criterion. The governmental entity might be the government itself, one 
of its agencies or officials, or, with respect to state government, one of 
its political subdivisions. If both a state and a federal entity are parties 
to the same suit, on the same side, with only private parties on the 
other, the case is included in both Tables 1 and 2. A case is included 
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues 
affecting the outcome of the case and the issues are resolved by differing 
voting alignments. 
A suit against an official in his personal capacity is included if he 
is represented by government attorneys or the interests of the state are 
otherwise clearly implicated. In instances of multiple parties, a civil 
case is excluded if governmental entities appear on both sides of the 
controversy. This rule was applied, for example, to exclude Martin v. 
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989) (the firefighters case) from Tables 1 and 
2 because the City of Birmingham and Jefferson County were parties 
to the case on one side and the United States was a plaintiff-intervenor 
on the other side. 
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4. Classification by nature of the issue 
A case is included in each category (Tables 5 through 9) for which 
it raises a relevant issue that is addressed in the written opinion(s). One 
case may thus be included in two or more tables. A case is also included 
more than once in the same table if it raises two or more distinct issues 
in that category affecting the disposition of the case and the issues are 
resolved by differing voting alignments. A case is not included for any 
issue which, though raised by one of the litigants, is not addressed in 
any opinion. 
Identification of first amendment and equal protection issues poses 
no special problem. In each instance the nature of the claim is expressly 
identified in the opinion. Issues of speech, press, association and free 
exercise of religion are included. Establishment clause cases are ex-
cluded, however, because one party's claim of religious establishment is 
often arrayed against another party's claim of free exercise, or some 
other individual right, thus blurring the issue of individual rights. 
Cases included in Table 7, statutory civil rights claims, are limited 
to those invoking relevant sections of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as 
amended; the Voting Rights Act of 1965; the civil rights statutes ap-
pearing in 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1988 (1982); and other federal statutes 
expressly barring discrimination on the basis of race, color, national 
origin, sex, religion, age, or physical handicap. Actions brought under 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 are included if the substantive right asserted is based 
on a federal statute or if the issue is the application of § 1983-that is, 
whether or how the statutory protections apply in the case at hand. 
However, § 1983 actions are excluded if the substantive right asserted 
is based on the United States Constitution and the issue relates to that 
right. The purpose of the § 1983 exclusion is to preserve a distinction 
between constitutional and non-constitutional claims. 
For Table 8, jurisdictional questions are defined to include not 
only jurisdiction per se but also standing, mootness, ripeness, absten-
tion, equitable discretion, and justiciability. Jurisdictional questions are 
excluded if neither party challenges jurisdiction and no member of the 
Court dissents on the question, even though the Court may comment on 
its jurisdiction. 
Table 9 (federalism cases) is limited to issues raised by conflicting 
actions of federal and state or local governments. Common examples 
are preemption, intergovernmental immunities, application of the tenth 
and eleventh amendments as a limit on action by the federal govern-
ment, and federal court interference with state court activities (other 
than review of state court decisions). Issues of "horizontal" federalism 
or interstate relationships, such as those raised by the dormant com-
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merce clause or the privileges and immunities clause, are excluded from 
the table. 
B. Cases Included in Statistical Tables* 
Table 1: Civil Cases: State I Local Government versus Private Party 
Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 633 
(1989). 
Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, Div. of Taxation, New Jersey Dep't 
of Treasury, 109 S. Ct. 1617 (1989). 
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 109 S. Ct. 1294 (1989). 
Blanchard v. Bergeron, 109 S. Ct. 939 (1989). 
Board of Estimate v. Morris, 109 S. Ct. 1433 (1989). 
Board of Trustees v. Fox, 109 S. Ct. 3028 (1989). 
Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of Yakima Indian Nation, 
109 S. Ct. 2994 (1989). 
Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378 (1989). 
California v. Arc America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661 (1989). 
California State Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 
2228 ( 1989). 
City of Canton v. Harris, 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989). 
City of Dallas v. Stangl in, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989). 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989). 
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